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INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCTS
EXCEPTION IN THE DEFINITION OF "FACILITY"
UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "the Act")' in response to growing con-
cern over the possible effects of hazardous waste sites on public health and the envi-
ronment.2 Through CERCLA, Congress intended to "provide for liability, compensa-
tion, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the envi-
ronment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."3
To accomplish these goals, CERCLA imposes a system of strict liability." Lia-
bility results where the federal or state government has incurred necessary response
costs5 due to a release or threatened release6 of a hazardous substance' by a person
from a vessel or facility. The definition of "facility" in the Act exempts "any consumer
product in consumer use" from CERCLA liability."
CERCLA was quickly cobbled together from existing proposals and passed with
relatively little debate by a lame duck Congress. This process is reflected in the limited
legislative history9 and often ambiguous language of the Act." Numerous terms in
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. The public demand for Congressional action regarding the control and cleanup of hazardous
materials was heightened following the discovery of the disaster at Love Canal. It has been estimated
that there are more than 47,000 sites contaminated by hazardous substances in the United States. See
Daniel Riesel, Private Hazardous Substance Litigation, C855 ALI-ABA 485 (1993).
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). See
also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting F. Anderson, D.
Mandelker, & A. Tarlock, Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 568 (1984)) and H.R. Rep. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (purpose
was to "initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control
the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites").
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See, e.g., U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d
Cir. 1992); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989); New York v. Shore Real-
ty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See, e.g., U.S. v. Aceto Agr. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th
Cir. 1989); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278
(D.Del. 1987), affd 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) (definition of release).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (definition of hazardous substance). Hazardous substances under
CERCLA are defined by reference to designations in other environmental statutes.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) reads:
The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
9. See Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-
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the statute suffer for lack of clarity and explanation. In particular, Congress neglected
to include a definition of "consumer product" in the statute or to discuss the consumer
products exception to any significant degree during drafting or debate. As a result,
federal courts have been obliged to interpret the meaning of "consumer product" with
little Congressional guidance.
With respect to the consumer products exception, courts have split over the
meaning which Congress intended in section 9601(9)(B). The court in Reading Compa-
ny v. Philadelphia" limited the exception to cases of individual consumer use of a
hazardous substance and so preserved the broad remedial reach of CERCLA. In con-
trast, the 5th Circuit in Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products
Co.2 interpreted the exception to apply to "useful consumer products."' 3
Using the Dayton interpretation, a current or past owner or operator may seek to
avoid liability for cleanup at a hazardous waste site by claiming that the hazardous
substances involved have a commercial character and are in consumer use. Continued
judicial application of the Dayton sense of "consumer product in consumer use" will
expand the exception and ultimately restrict the scope of the Act in a manner contrary
to legislative intent and damaging to the statutory purpose.
II. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
A. The "Useful Consumer Products" Interpretation of § 9601(9)(B)
In Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products Co.,4 a school
district sought to recover from the manufacturer and suppliers the costs of removing
asbestos-containing materials ("ACMs") from school buildings. 5 The plaintiffs
brought a consolidated claim under CERCLA section 9607(a)(3), arguing that the
buildings in which the ACMs were installed constituted "facilities" for the purposes of
510 (Comm. Print 1983). See generally, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Needham and Menefee,
eds. 1982); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENv'L L. 1 (1982) (for description of
the evolution and passage of CERCLA in the U.S. Congress). Courts have also noted that the legisla-
tive history provides little guidance. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland, 805 F.2d 1074 at
1080-81 (1st Cir. 1986); U.S. v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1264-66 (D.C. Del. 1986)
(noting sparse legislative history); United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 699 F. Supp.
1384, 1388 (D. Iowa 1988), affid in part, rev'd and remanded in part 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
10. CERCLA has been widely criticized as difficult to interpret. See, e.g., Artesian Water Compa-
ny v. Gov't of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm
of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities
attributable to its precipitous passage."); Retirement Community Developers Inc. v. Merine, 713 F.
Supp. 153, 156 (D. Md. 1989) ("It is undisputed that CERCLA presents difficult questions of interpre-
tation."); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a
well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative
history").
11. Reading Company v. Philadelphia, 823 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
12. Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.
1990).
13. Courts following Dayton include: People v. Blech, 976 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1992); Kane v.
United States, 841 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (house containing asbestos is "consumer product in
consumer use" according to the Dayton "useful consumer products" interpretation); Vernon Village, Inc.
v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990).
14. 906 F.2d 1059.
15. Id. at 1061.
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CERCLA liability. 6 Dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under CERCLA, the Fifth Circuit held "that Congress did not contem-
plate recovery under this statute of the costs incurred to effect asbestos removal from
buildings.""
In part, the court based its decision on its analysis of the term "facility" in sec-
tion 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA. The plaintiffs argued that the "facilities" in question were
the buildings in which the asbestos-containing materials were installed. 8 Rejecting
this argument as "wasted effort," the court concluded that the building materials them-
selves were the "facilities" and constituted "consumer products in consumer use."' 9
Without citing any legislative history or statutory purposes, the court stated that "the
provision exempting consumer products obviously was meant to protect from liability
those who engage in production activities with a useful purpose, as opposed to those
engaged in the disposal of hazardous substances."' Therefore, clearly "Congress did
not intend CERCLA to target legitimate manufacturers or sellers of useful prod-
ucts."'
2
The court in Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier," following the Dayton decision,
held that CERCLA did not apply to hazardous materials found in a useful consumer
product.23 The chromium and radionuclides contained in a drinking water supply sys-
tem were within the consumer products exception and thus outside the ambit of
CERCLA.24 In People v. Blech,25 the court held that the lessee of a commercial
property could not recover from the lessor any costs for removing asbestos dust even
though the dust was produced as a result of a fire.26
B. The Individual Consumer Interpretation of § 9601(9)(B)
In Reading Company v. Philadelphia,7 the Reading railroad company sought
contribution from the city of Philadelphia and other railroads for clean-up costs in-
curred and anticipated in removing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from facilities in
and around the Reading Terminal train shed.'
Beginning in the 1930's, Reading converted the passenger lines which ran in
and out of this terminal from steam to electric power, completing the electrification in
1961. Each electric rail car housed a traction motor which in turn was equipped with a
transformer to reduce the voltage running to the railcar from the overhead catenaries.
The transformers were cooled by a pump-driven liquid cooling system containing
either mineral oil or PCB based fluids. Through normal operation of these transformers
plus leaks and lack of maintenance, PBCs were released into the railbeds and contami-
16. Id. at 1065.
17. Id. at 1066.
18. Id.
19. id.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990).
23. Id. at 1151.
24. Id.
25. People v. Blech, 976 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1992).
26. Id. at 526.
27. Reading, 823 F. Supp. 1218.
28. Id. at 1229.
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nated the Reading terminal and nearby viaduct.29
Reading maintained that part of the contamination occurred during the time when
the defendants owned and operated railcars in the Reading Terminal and therefore the
defendants should contribute to cleanup costs of the contaminated area under
CERCLA. The defendants argued, among other things, that because the railcars
were used by passengers, they were "consumer products in consumer use" and were
thus outside the ambit of the statute.3
Noting that CERCLA fails to define "consumer product," the Reading court
employed the rules of statutory construction to interpret the term.32 First, the court
quoted definitions of "consumer product" in Black's Dictionary33 and in the Consum-
er Products Safety Act' for the ordinary meaning of the term. The court then exam-
ined the statute's legislative history, citing Senator Cannon's remarks during floor
debate of the bill and in explanation of the amendment35 plus the Senate report on the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA").' Concluding that Con-
gress intended the phrase to exempt individual consumers from CERCLA liability, the
court held that an entity operating a commuter train service does not operate the
railcars as consumer products in consumer use.37
Following Reading, the court in KN Energy, Inc. v. Rockwell International Cor-
poration3 ruled that pipelines do not constitute consumer products for the purposes of
CERCLA exemption. 39 The defendant, using the "useful consumer products" interpre-
tation in Dayton, argued that the consumer products exception insulates from liability
those engaged in productive activities.' The court disagreed, citing the statutory anal-
ysis in Reading and holding that the exception to the definition of "facility" applied to
individual consumers, not a commercial business.4' The pipelines were commercial
facilities used to provide a consumer service just like the railcars used in commuter
train service in Reading.42 Again, in CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Associ-
ates,43 purchasers sought to recover costs of cleaning up ACMs found in a hotel
building after its demolition." Using the same Senate committee report as the Read-
ing court to clarify the meaning of the exclusion, the court held that the site was a
"facility" and not a "consumer product in consumer use."
45
29. Id. at 1222.
30. Id. at 1224.
31. Id. at 1234.
32. Id. at 1232-33 (citing the "canons of statutory interpretation").
33. Id. at 1233 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 317 (6th ed. 1990): "Any tangible personal prop-
erty which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes . . . ").
34. Id. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
35. Id. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 1233-34. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
37. Sd. at 1233.
38. KN Energy, Inc. v. Rockwell International Corporation, 840 F. Supp. 95 (D. Colo. 1993).




43. CP Holdings, Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Associates, 769 F. Supp. 432 (D.N.H. 1991).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 438.
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IH. RECOMMENDED AMENDMENT TO CERCLA
The "consumer products in consumer use" exception to the definition of "facili-
ty" in CERCLA "helps define the overall scope of CERCLA by excluding consumer
products being used by consumers who thereby cause what would otherwise be a
CERCLA release."'"
The legislative history cited by the Reading court "shows that the exclusion was
intended to prevent "an individual consumer" from possibly being subject to strict
liability under CERCLA for a "release" from a product in consumer use." '47 During
floor debate on the original bill, Senator Cannon, later the sponsor of the amendment,
stated that:
[The bill] contains no exclusion for consumer products. Therefore, it has been
suggested that this would mean that an individual consumer is subject to strict,
joint and several liability for a "release" from any product that contains one of the
numerous hazardous substances listed on Pages 24 to 28 of the Senate Environmen-
tal and Public Works Committee report. While staff has been informed that such a
result was not intended, the term "facility" as it is presently defined would include
consumer products, and the report does not in any way clarify that this term does
not include consumer products. An amendment will be offered to clarify this mat-
ter.
Senator Cannon, upon introduction of the amendment, stated that the it "would exclude
consumer products from the definition of "facility", thus precluding any unintended
notification requirements and liability provisions to consumers. 49 The official Senate
report in support of the passage of SARA in 1986 plainly supports this interpretation
of section 9601(9)(B). 0 Clearly, Congress intended the consumer products exception
to protect individual consumers from liability, not to shield a current or former owner
or operator responsible for the release of hazardous substances.
The Dayton court makes sweeping application to CERCLA legislative history but
fails to cite specific language in support of its "useful purpose" interpretation. Nowhere
in the legislative history of this exception does the legislature refer to the purpose,
useful or otherwise, of the product to interpret the definition of "consumer product in
consumer use."
Nevertheless, in cases citing Dayton, judicial application of the "useful consumer
products exception" has limited the broad reach of CERCLA liability and thus frustrat-
ed the goals of the exception and the Act itself.
In order to clarify CERCLA and promote judicial interpretation of the Act con-
sistent with legislative intent, Congress should amend the statute to include a definition
of "consumer product" like that used in Reading. The definition of "consumer product"
46. Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAw. 923, 961 (1990).
47. Id. at 962.
48. 126 Cong. Rec. S12917 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon).
49. 126 Cong. Rec. at S13364 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon).
50. S. Rep. No. 11, 99th Congress, 1st Sess. 11 (1985). The Senate Report stated that the "con-
sumer products" limitation was designed to ensure that amendments to CERCLA did not "extend the
coverage of this amendment to finished consumer products such as those that might be found in a
retail store, where such products do not present a threat or release from a facility."
1995]
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in the Consumer Products Safety Act of 1980," a statute in force at the time of the
passage of CERCLA, effectively emphasizes the nature of the exception and promotes
limited application to individual consumers and would thus be an appropriate amend-
ment. The language would be inserted following the section 9601(5) definition of
"claimant" and would read:
(6) The term "consumer product" means any article, or component part thereof,
produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent
or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii)
for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a per-
manent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or other-
wise.5"
As courts continue to hear claims under CERCLA, more potentially responsible
parties may try to employ the "useful consumer products" interpretation of section
9601 (9)(B) to escape liability for release of hazardous substances into the environment.
By adopting the above definition of "consumer product," Congress may prevent those
parties from avoiding liability under the Act. The legislature should address this prob-
lem of interpretation and others like it in order to improve CERCLA and show that
public health and the environment are matters of concern not only to the American
people but to Congress as well.
Patricia Reid'
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a) (1982).
52. Alternatively, the section could read:
(6) The term "consumer product" shall have the meaning provided in 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a) of
the Consumer Products Safety Act.
* B.A. Government and International Affairs, University of Notre Dame, 1986; J.D. Candidate,
Notre Dame Law School, 1996.
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